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INTRODUCTION
From 1920 to 196o, the rate of owner occupancy in the American housing
market rose from 46% to 62%.1 These numbers, however, explain only a small
part of the significance of the federal government's New Deal intervention in
the housing market. The creation of the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) to insure lenders against the risk of default on single-family mortgages
fundamentally transformed what it meant to own a house in America. Prior to
the 1930s, owner-occupied housing was a good held primarily for reasons of
consumption-not investment-and usually acquired late in life.2 Through
New Deal reforms, homeownership became the primary mechanism that
middle-class Americans use to build assets.3 Today, 6o% of the total assets of
middle-class Americans are held in owner-occupied homes.4
Transforming America's housing market required a legal revolution, one
that previous commentators have not fully explained. In order to make
homeownership affordable to most Americans over the majority of their
working lives, lenders had to accept far lower down payments than they ever
had before -saving up for the pre-New Deal standard of one-third or more of
the value of the home could take many years. And they had to allow
homebuyers to spread out loan payments over far longer terms than they had
before- the prior practice of making a mortgage to a homebuyer for only five
to seven years made it impossible for most people to ever fully own their
homes. State and federal banking law prohibited lenders from lowering down
payment requirements and lengthening terms, and for good reason. Such
changes would pose genuine threats to lenders' "safety and soundness" because
they would expose lenders to greater risks of default.'
Despite the risk involved, the FHA decided that it would insure low-down-
payment, long-term mortgages in order to promote homeownership. Once the
FHA had made that decision, it needed to change dozens of federal and state
laws to make those mortgages legal. It had a very good argument for doing so:
The increased rate of default on such loans would not threaten lenders' safety
and soundness because the FHA, as an insurer, would take over payments in
1. 2 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 646 (corrected reprint 1989) [hereinafter
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS].
2. See infra Section IA.
3. See infra Section I.B.
4. Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Wealth Oumership, from 1983 to 1998, in ASSETS FOR THE
POOR 34, 46 (Thomas M. Shapiro & Edward N. Wolff eds., 2001). This is the rate for the
middle three quintiles of Americans by wealth.
s. See infra Section II.A.
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case of default. This Note illuminates for the first time how the FHA convinced
all federal bank regulators and all forty-eight state legislatures to make
exceptions to safety-and-soundness regulations for loans that it insured.6
I argue that these policies, while logical and benign on the surface, in fact
produced devastating results for African-Americans. As historian Kenneth
Jackson and others have described, the FHA's core insurance program, section
2o3(b), systematically discriminated against African-Americans. 7 The FHA
produced underwriting guidelines based on an economically and historically
flawed understanding of a "natural" progression of neighborhood racial change
from all-white (with high property values) to all-black (with low property
values). These guidelines rated a neighborhood's suitability for insurance
based on racial composition, encouraged or mandated racial covenants as a
condition for insurance, and discouraged integrated neighborhoods.
Commentators such as Paul Boudreaux and Robert Ellickson have
downplayed the importance of the FHA's racial discrimination, instead arguing
that personal preferences have driven racial segregation.8 Underlying their
skepticism of the FHA's importance is the reasonable question: "If substantial
numbers of African-Americans would have taken out insured mortgages, why
didn't businesses develop to serve that market?" This Note answers that
question for the first time. Congress and state legislatures granted exemptions
to bank safety-and-soundness regulations only for FHA-insured mortgages -
not for mortgages insured by the private sector. Thus, if the FlA would not
insure a particular borrower, that borrower could not get a low-down-
payment, long-term mortgage from any source.9 The FHA's discretionary
guidelines effectively became binding law, giving whites a generation's head
start on accumulating wealth through homeownership, a fact reflected in
concrete data from the census and land records.' ° This reality suggests that
government policy fostered segregated housing patterns to a greater degree
than many commentators have previously thought.
I argue that the integration of section 20 3(b) forty years ago through an
Executive Order by President Kennedy" did not sufficiently remedy the
pervasive system of FHA discrimination against African-Americans. Simply
making FHA-insured loans available to blacks did not compensate for the
dramatic advantage that whites had enjoyed for decades in the homebuying
6. See infra Sections II.B-D.
7. See infra Section III.A. Section 2o3(b) was originally passed as part of the National Housing
Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 5 203, 48 Star. 1246, 1248 (1934).
8. See infra Section III.C.
9. See infra Section II.A.
1o. See infra Sections II.E, III.B.
ii. See infra Section IV.A.
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market, an advantage that may explain why the median white household has
ten times as much wealth as the median black household today.12 In addition,
the end of discrimination in the FHA program failed to eliminate the view of
neighborhood racial transition and composition that the FHA's insurance
guidelines cemented in the American mind: that whites could prosper only by
living separately from blacks, and that blacks moving into a neighborhood
signified imminent price decline. The past acceptance of these empirically
faulty characterizations as official federal policy may help account for why
American metropolitan areas remain highly segregated by race.13
I end this Note by briefly considering potential remedies to housing
segregation and racial disparities in wealth that others have proposed. I do not
explicitly endorse these remedies or exhaustively describe their constitutional
implications. Because this Note fully explains for the first time the regulatory
base that girded the FHA's discretionary administrative actions, I simply wish
to suggest areas in which my research may help build a stronger case for action
to remedy past discrimination and ongoing inequalities.' 4
Much of my data and examples derive from Connecticut records,
particularly those covering New Haven. However, the patterns I describe could
be seen in any metropolitan area, and I cite national data and statutes from all
states to show that Connecticut's experience mirrored those of other states.
I. CREATING AN ASSET CLASS: HOW THE NEW DEAL REDEFINED
HOMEOWNERSHIP
A. Why Early Homebuying Did Not Result in Asset Building
Today, Americans think of buying a home as a way to build stability - one
that provides both a guaranteed place to live for years to come (as long as the
mortgage payments are met) and a way to build assets. And, for most
homebuying Americans, the system actually provides stability: As of March
12. Thomas M. Shapiro & Jessica L. Kenty-Drane, The Racial Wealth Gap, in AFRIcAN
AMERICANS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 175, 177 (Cecilia A. Conrad et al. eds., 2005). This
disparity persists even when adjusting for income: White earners in the top 20% of
households have a median net worth of $133,6oo, while blacks in that category have a
median net worth of $43,800. Id. The common methodology in this field includes, when
calculating net worth, principal residence, liquid assets, pension accounts (though not Social
Security), stock, and business equity. See Wolff, supra note 4, at 37, 46. Generally, the
wealth disparity between the races is much greater than the income disparity.
13. See infra Section IV.B.
14. See infra Section IV.C.
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2005, only 1.12% of all home loans are currently in the foreclosure process,"s
and homes make up the core of most households' asset base. 
6
Buying a home in America in the early twentieth century did not provide
similar stability. Homeowners rarely ended up owning their home clear of any
further obligation to make mortgage payments. Instead, they took out a
mortgage from a bank or other lender that was often only partly amortized-
i.e., that did not result in the buyer owning the home outright at the end of the
mortgage. 7 When the loan became due in five to seven years, the homebuyer
would generally have to find another mortgage for a several-year period. If she
could not do so (due to factors such as rising interest rates), she would have to
sell her home.s Thus, buying a home still presented a substantial risk that,
within a decade, a buyer would be forced to move.
Because buyers had to save substantial sums of money before buying a
home, homeownership for most people only became accessible in old age,
leaving them with too little time to use their homes to build assets. Lenders
generally provided first mortgages for only up to half of the value of a home.' 9
If a prospective buyer had not saved up enough funds to pay for half of the
value of the house, she might seek a second mortgage,2" either from an anxious
seller, from individuals, or from other nonbank entities specializing in second
mortgages." But these second mortgages would finance only half of the
is. Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, Residential Mortgage Delinquencies and
Foreclosures Down from Last Year, According to MBA National Delinquency Survey (Mar.
17, 2005), http://www.mortgagebankers.org/news/20os/pro3l7.html. I do not mean to
discount the pain that those in foreclosure experience, or the rising foreclosure rates that
many attribute to predatory lending. See, e.g., Margot Saunders, The Increase in Predatory
Lending and Appropriate Remedial Actions, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 111 (2002). I simply seek to
point out that these problems are faced by a relatively small minority of homebuyers as
compared with one hundred years ago, when almost all homebuyers faced uncertainty about
how long they could hold onto their homes.
16. See Wolff, supra note 4, at 46 tbl.2.5.
17. DOROTHY ROSENMAN, A MILLION HOMES A YEAR 21-22 (1945). Today the near-universal
practice is full amortization, in which a homebuyer gets a mortgage, usually for thirty years,
by the end of which she is the full owner of the home.
18. I generally use "she" when describing homeowners because my research using the New
Haven Land Records revealed that early-twentieth-century home titles were often held by
women.
19. ROSENMAN, supra note 17, at 23.
zo. Id.
21. Lisa Marshall found that these second mortgages generally came from nonbank sources. See
Lisa Marshall, New Haven's Mortgage Markets in an Era of Urbanism 65-66 (2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). This structure was at least partly due to
regulatory restrictions. See infra Part II.
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remaining purchase price, ' still leaving the homebuyer in need of a down
payment of one-fourth to one-third of the value of the home.
It appears that this savings requirement presented a significant barrier to
homeownership early in life. While in 192o only 35% of households headed by
thirty-five-year-olds owned homes, the comparable rate for households headed
by those over sixty was more than 6o%.3 This system of homeownership for a
short duration at the end of one's life meant that homeownership presented
few asset-building opportunities, because the owner had less time to enjoy
appreciation before death. 4
B. How Mortgage Market Collapse Produced New Deal Reforms
As a result of the Great Depression, home mortgage foreclosures rose from
sixty-eight thousand per year in 1926 to one thousand homes per day in early
1933, when half of all mortgages in the United States were in default." As
urban historian Kenneth Jackson has pointed out, these foreclosures affected
not just the poor, but also middle-class families. The wide range of people
affected fostered demand for federal action from unexpected sources, including
from Republican congressmen who otherwise opposed President Roosevelt's
government expansion. 6
The federal government first reacted to the situation by buying up
defaulted loans from banks under the auspices of the Home Owners' Loan
Corporation (HOLC) and refinancing them on more favorable terms.7 But
22. Marshall, supra note 21, at 66.
23. Mark J. Stem, The Un(credit)worthy Poor: Historical Perspectives on Policies To Expand Assets
and Credit, in ASSETS FOR THE POOR, supra note 4, at 269, 282 tbl.8.2. Overall
homeownership rates hovered between 45% and 48% from 1900 to 1930, perhaps indicating
a limit to the potential for ownership with these early forms of financing. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 1.
z4. The owner's heirs might benefit, but because of the short terms of ownership, property
rarely ended up "free and clear" of mortgages for bequest. Heirs could continue to make
payments on a mortgage if they could afford to do so, or recoup through sale some of the
last generation's savings and, possibly, a small amount of appreciation generated over the
few years of homeownership.
25. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED
STATES 193 (1985). Jackson's study of New Deal housing policy is the work legal scholars
and historians most frequently cite on New Deal housing policy, particularly the racial
discrimination by the federal government discussed infra Part III.
26. Id. at 196.
27. HOLC was created by the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, § 4(a), 48
Stat. 128, 129. Many statutes in this Note are cited only for their historical importance and
are no longer enforced. The current status of such laws is not indicated unless relevant in the
context of this Note.
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HOLC did not have a long-term effect on the American housing market.
HOLC often proved unable to collect payments from homeowners already in
financial trouble,2" and Congress only created HOLC as a short-term, stop-gap
measure, phasing it out of existence by 1936.29
The federal government's next move, however, was of profound and
lasting importance. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), created by
the National Housing Act of 1934,30 restarted the slow lending market, limiting
the risk of future foreclosures for lenders by insuring them against default on
mortgages. Borrowers paid a premium of a half-percent on top of the standard
interest rates paid to the lender,3' which went into a reserve fund held by the
FHA that indemnified lenders in case of default.3" In addition, in case the
reserve fund ran out of money, the federal government promised to pay lenders
from general funds. 33 In effect, the federal government enabled lenders to
provide home mortgage credit without any risk of loss - a vital guarantee given
how much money those lenders had lost in the foreclosures of the early
Depression.
The FHA did far more than simply restart a lending industry that had
faltered at the onset of the Depression. Through guidelines that specified
which loans would be eligible for insurance, the FHA fundamentally
transformed the mortgage market. The FlA standards allowed mortgages
with low down payments-initially 20%, then 1o%, and by the mid-196os,
3%.' Moreover, these mortgages extended for long terms-initially twenty
years, soon twenty-five, and then thirty.3" At the end of those terms, the
homeowner fully owned the home and did not need another mortgage. 36 The
FHA thus allowed younger households to buy homes with the assurance that
they would not be forced out of those homes at the end of a short-term
28. One out of five properties that HOLC financed ended up in foreclosure, despite HOLC's
relatively generous policies. C. LowELL HARRiss, HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOME
OWNERS' LoAN CORPORATION 71 (1951).
29. Home Owners' Loan Act § 4(d).
30. Pub. L. No. 73-479,48 Stat. 1246 (934).
31. The Financial Health of the Federal Housing Administration's Single Family Mutual Mortgage
Insurance Fund: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmry. Opportunity of the H. Comm.
on Fin. Servs., io 7th Cong. 73 (2001) (statement of Susan Gaffney, Inspector General,
Department of Housing and Urban Development).
32. JACKSON, supra note 25, at 204.
33. Id.
34. CHESTER RAPKIN ET AL., THE PRIVATE INSURANCE OF HOME MORTGAGES: A STUDY OF
MORTGAGE GUARANTY INSURANCE CORPORATION 15 (1967); ROSENMAN, supra note 17, at 38.
35- RAPKIN ET AL., supra note 34, at 14.
36. JACKSON, supra note 25, at 204.
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mortgage, and granted them an opportunity to build significant assets through
homeownership.
The FHA pursued these policy objectives even though they made providing
insurance more risky. Lowering down payment requirements meant that, all
other things being equal, foreclosure was more likely because the buyer had
less equity in the house. Thus, if home values declined even a small amount, it
would make economic sense for the borrower to walk away from the home
instead of continuing payments on her mortgage.
Similarly, longer terms meant that banks received smaller payments each
month than they would have with a short-term loan of the same size. A long
term also includes more turns of the business cycle, making borrower defaults
(and FHA payouts) more likely. Finally, for the entire term, the same amount
of money remained unavailable for making other loans, creating the additional
risk that the bank would not be able to either take advantage of better business
opportunities as they came up or adjust to higher-interest-rate environments.3 7
These changes are what fundamentally transformed homeownership from
a short-term, consumption-driven experience for a minority of Americans to
the main tool that most Americans use for asset building over the long term.
Being able to borrow larger sums over longer terms made homeownership
radically more affordable. 8 The federal government took on significantly more
risk in its insurance program in order to satisfy mounting public pressure to
increase affordable homeownership opportunities. This pressure came not just
from citizens, but, perhaps even more vehemently, from developers and related
businesses hit hard by the Depression. 9
II. HOW CHANGES IN BANKING LAW GAVE THE FHA A MONOPOLY
ON AFFORDABLE MORTGAGES
A. Why FHA-Insured Loans Were Illegal
In order for the FHA to insure high loan-to-value-ratio (LTVR), long-term
loans, it had to change dozens of state and federal laws so that lenders could
make these loans in the first place. At the time, Congress and state legislatures
37. Mortgages were issued with fixed rates of interest. The adjustable-rate mortgage, which
varies the interest rate with the prime rate and thus reduces risk to the lender due to rising
interest rates, did not become widely available until the early 198os. John L. Culhane, Jr. &
D. Edwin Schmelzer, Variable Rate Credit, 37 Bus. LAw. 1391, 1391 (1982).
38. See infra Section II.E.
39. Florence Wagner Roisman, National Ingratitude: The Egregious Deficiencies of the United
States' Housing Programs for Veterans and the "Public Scandal" of Veterans' Homelessness, 38
IND. L. REV. 103,118 (2005).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
115: 18 6 2005
THE CREATION OF HOMEOWNERSHIP
strictly regulated permissible uses of banks' assets, regulations that (in much
diminished form) still survive today. Those regulations generally limited
LTVRs on first mortgages to levels much lower than the 90% allowed by the
FHA because of the added risk low-down-payment mortgages entailed. They
also limited loan terms to periods far shorter than the periods allowed by the
FHA, again manifesting a genuine concern about the risk to banks' depositors.
As a result, the FHA needed Congress and state legislatures to waive
hundreds of regulations, at least for the loans that it insured. Previous
commentators have failed to understand this critical fact about the FHA. While
one commentator has noted that the FHA requested changes in law from state
legislatures,4" and another has mentioned that the federal government changed
its own regulations for national banks,4' no one has yet explained that this
legislation constituted a massive transformation of American mortgage
regulation.
The FHA had a compelling economic case for requesting such waivers:
Treating insured loans differently from uninsured loans made sense from a
safety-and-soundness standpoint. From the banks' perspective, insurance
balanced out the risks of lower-down-payment, longer-term loans by
guaranteeing that, even if the property value went down and the buyer quit
making payments, or if the buyer defaulted twenty years into a twenty-five-
year loan, the bank would be made whole by the insurance fund. These
assurances and the political pressure for new ways to support homeownership
led Congress and every state legislature to rapidly pass the requisite
exemptions from bank safety-and-soundness laws.42
These exemptions applied only to mortgages insured by the FHA-not to
those insured by private insurers. And it was certainly possible for private
insurers to play a significant role in the market. Private mortgage insurance
was a big business in the 1920S. Because lenders often were limited by statute
to lending within a concentrated geographic area,43 they had a particular risk of
multiple concurrent defaults. One plant closing in a small city, for example,
could adversely affect a bank's entire portfolio. The mortgage insurers helped
lenders hedge against this risk. Centered in New York to take advantage of a
favorable regulatory environment, the industry grew in the boom times of the
1920S from a total of $529 million of mortgages insured in 1920 to $2.8 billion
40. MARc A. WEISS, THE RSE OF THE COmMUNITY BUILDERS 154 (1987).
41. CHARLES M. HAAR, FEDERAL CREDIT AND PRIVATE HOUSING: THE MASS FINANCING DILEMMA
59 n.5 (1960). Note that Haar incorrectly implies that state legislatures did not make similar
amendments to safety-and-soundness regulations.
42. See infra Sections II.B-D.
43. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3999 (193o) (limiting mortgages by Connecticut savings
banks to homes in Connecticut and a few counties in neighboring states).
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in 1930. But the regulatory environment proved too permissive, leading to a
collapse during the Depression that ended with the State of New York taking
over the remaining companies in 1933 and banning private mortgage insurance
in 1934.44
These insurers had never been granted the exemptions from safety-and-
soundness statutes,4 and they were not granted exemptions when the FHA
received its exemptions. One might speculate that legislatures simply
determined that the private mortgage insurance industry was no longer viable
after the New Deal collapse, especially after New York banned the practice. But
evidence exists to the contrary; for example, California passed new authorizing
legislation allowing private mortgage insurers in 1935.46 In fact, the evidence
suggests that the FA proposed exemptions for itself and not others and got
Congress and state legislatures to rapidly respond. Those legislatures often
adopted form language, perhaps proposed by the FHA,47 apparently without
considering the disparity created between the FHA and other potential
insurers.
In the following two Sections, I examine the regulatory changes on the
federal and state levels and demonstrate the broad reach of these regulatory
changes to lending institutions regulated by numerous federal agencies and all
forty-eight states. I then use census data to show the truly massive effect of
these regulations. The data are clear: Those who could get an FHA-insured
loan got far more valuable houses than those who could not, even though they
made roughly the same monthly mortgage payment.
B. Federal Banking Regulation: National Banks
In the 1930s, as now, the banking industry was divided into two parallel
systems :48 national lending institutions established under the National Bank
Act of 186349 and the Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933,0 and state banking
44. Mortgage insurance companies failed because they held insurance company investments in
mortgages (thus, if the value of mortgages declined, so would the value of the investments
needed to pay out the companies' obligations) and granted mortgages based on poor
appraisals. Close financial ties between the insurance companies and banks they insured also
contributed to these failures. See RAPKIN ET AL., supra note 34, at 24, 27, 37.
4s. Looking at the banking statutes discussed infra Sections II.B-D, one finds no mention of
these firms.
46. Insurance Code, div. 2, pt. 6, ch. 2, 1935 Cal. Stat. 496, 747.
47. See infra text accompanying note 70.
4e. See JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., BANKING LAWAND REGULATION 12 ( 3d ed. 2001).
49. Pub. L. No. 37-58, 12 Stat. 665 (1863).
50. Pub. L. No. 73-43, § 5, 48 Stat. 128, 132 (1933).
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institutions chartered under state law. Both national and state lending
institutions' investments were tightly regulated for safety and soundness in
order to protect depositor assets.
From 1864 to 1913, national banks generally were prohibited from "the
possession of any real estate under mortgage." s Two rationales for this
prohibition were that the federal government wanted to keep capital revolving
through commerce and that mortgages tied up a bank's capital in property for
long periods. 2 In 1913, the Federal Reserve Act allowed banks to make loans
secured by farmland, but only for five-year terms, and at an LTVR of 50% or
less. 3 It was not until 1927 that national banks could issue any mortgages
secured by nonfarm real estate, and even then the five-year term limit and 5o%
LTVR cap remained in place.5 4
In 1934, upon creation of the FHA section 203(b) program, Congress
granted a full waiver of these limits for loans insured by the FHA, but not loans
insured by private mortgage insurers."5 In 1935 Congress allowed a 60% LTVR
and a maximum term of ten years for non-FHA-insured loans. 56 Regulations
were loosened somewhat in 1955- allowing banks to issue twenty-year, 66.7%
LTVR loans without FHA insurance 57-and again in 1959, when the LTVR
allowed was raised to 75%.58 These terms still fell far short of those for FHA-
insured loans, which by the mid-196os could have a 97% LTVR and a term of
thirty (and in some cases forty) years.5 9 It was not until 1970 that anything
even close to equivalent was allowed for national banks without FHA
insurance.6 o
s. National Bank Act of 1864, Pub. L. No. 38-1o6, 13 Stat. 99, io8.
52. Edward L. Symons, Jr., The "Business of Banking" in Historical Perspective, 51 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 676,716 (1983).
53. Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 24, 38 Stat. 251, 273 (1913).
54. McFadden Act, Pub. L. No. 69-639, § 16, 44 Stat. 1224, 1232-33 (1927).
S5. National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, § 505, 48 Stat. 1246, 1263 (1934). After 1982,
under more liberal lending guidelines, private mortgage insurance would be treated
similarly to FHA insurance. Private mortgage insurance was not recognized by statute prior
to 1982.
56. Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, § 208, 49 Stat. 684, 706. These limits only applied
to fully amortized loans, or those partly amortized loans that had to amortize at least 40% of
principal.
57. Act of Aug. 11, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-343, § 1, 69 Stat. 633, 633-34.
5s. Act of Sept. 9, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-251, § 4, 73 Stat. 487, 489.
59. RAPKIN ET AL., supra note 34, at 14-15.
6o. The Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, S 704, 84 Stat. 450, 462,
allowed 90% LTVR and a thirty-year term for uninsured, fully amortized loans. Subsequent
amendments transferred this information from the U.S. Code to regulation by the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). See Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act
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C. Federal Banking Regulation: Access to Credit for Thrifts
National banks were never intended to be the most important financial
institutions in creating homeownership. That distinction was given to thrift
institutions, especially savings and loan associations structured specifically to
make home mortgage loans. 6' Nationally, from 1925 to 1965, thrifts had a
higher share of the home lending market than any other institutional type,
with a market share ranging from 21% to 44%.62 Until 1933, thrift institutions
were chartered exclusively at the state level. 6' New Deal banking reforms
created federally chartered thrift institutions with the Home Owner's Loan Act
of 1933.64 Both the new federal and existing state thrifts could increase liquidity
of bank assets through another New Deal reform, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (FHLBB), which advanced short-term capital to banks that made
long-term obligations like mortgages.
From 1934 to 1982, the FHLBB held markedly different policies for fund
advances for FHA-insured and non-FHA-insured loans. The FHLBB would
only advance to its members 65% of the unpaid principal balance of a non-
FHA-insured mortgage, while it would advance 9o% of the unpaid principal
balance of an F-A-insured mortgage.66 This disparity meant that making
FHA-insured loans gave federally supervised thrifts significantly greater
liquidity than making uninsured or privately insured loans, which were never
allowed to draw from FHLBB funds at the 90% rate. For federal and state
thrifts that were part of the Federal Home Loan Bank system, only the FHA
insurance program offered a fiscally feasible path to originate high-LTVR,
long-term mortgages.
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, S 403(a), 96 Stat. 1469, 151o. The OCC has adopted liberal
rules: "A loan-to-value limit has not been established .... [F]or any such loan with a loan-
to-value-ratio that equals or exceeds 90 percent at origination, an institution should require
appropriate credit enhancement in the form of either mortgage insurance or readily
marketable collateral." Interagency Guidelines for Real Estate Lending: Supervisory Loan-
to-Value Limits, 12 C.F.R § 34, subpt. D, app. A, tbl. n.2 (2005). These guidelines also
apply to nationally chartered lending institutions regulated by the Office of Thrift
Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Reserve Board.
61. MACEY ET AL., supra note 48, at 15.
62. RAPKIN ET AL., supra note 34, at 18.
63. Paul T. Clark et al., The Regulation of Savings Associations Under the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of1989,45 Bus. LAw. 1013 (1990).
64. Pub. L. No. 73-43, S 5, 48 Stat. 128,132 (1933).
6s. See Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 72-304, 5 17, 47 Stat. 725, 736 (1932).
66. National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, § 501,48 Stat. 1246, 1261 (1934) (amended 1982).
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D. State Banking Regulation
State banking regulators had similarly restrictive limits on the maximum
LTVR and term that banks and thrifts could offer. And, like Congress, state
legislatures only carved out exceptions to these regulations for FHA-insured
loans. I have researched how all of the then-forty-eight states reacted to the
introduction of the FHA insurance program in 1934. Remarkably, forty state
legislatures granted exemptions to their safety-and-soundness regulations for
FHA-insured loans between January and June 1935.67 Another four state
legislatures did not meet in 1935; when they reconvened in 1936, all of these
states passed similar exemptions. 6" The final four states passed such
exemptions in 1937.69 Thirty-one of the forty-eight states7" used strikingly
broad form language that prevented most state lending laws from applying to
FHA-insured loans. For example, the California statute read:
No law of this State, prescribing the nature, amount or form of security
or requiring security upon which loans or investments may be made, or
prescribing or limiting interest rates upon loans or advances of credit or
prescribing or limiting the period for which loans or investments may
be made, shall be deemed to apply to loans or investments made
pursuant to the foregoing sections of this act. 1
Such language not only prevented any requirements regarding LTVRs or terms
from applying to FHA-insured loans, but also appears to have released lenders
from other regulations such as usury laws. In effect, state legislatures
abandoned their regulatory authority over FHA-insured loans, leaving the FIA
to regulate itself. And again, these exemptions did not apply to private
mortgage insurance.
I focus on Connecticut as an example of how regulations changed over
time. Connecticut granted the most limited exemptions on FHA insurance of
any state, retaining an upper limit on LTVRs and terms for FHA-insured loans
67. All states except for the states listed infra notes 68-69 passed such exceptions. See infra
Appendix I for citations and dates of passage.
68. Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia. See infra Appendix I for citations and dates
of passage.
69. Georgia, Illinois, Ohio, and Utah. See infra Appendix I for citations and dates of passage.
70. Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
71. Act of Jan. 30, 1935, ch. 6, § 5, 1935 Cal. Stat. 54, 55. This phrasing is replicated verbatim (or
close to it) in the thirty other states.
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for many years. 72 But as I show below, Connecticut-chartered institutions still
faced far more favorable regulatory treatment if they made FHA-insured loans
instead of conventional loans.
At the beginning of the section 203(b) program, Connecticut building-and-
loan societies - Connecticut's state-chartered thrifts - could make 8o% LTVR
loans. This LTVR was much higher than any other Connecticut or federal
institution could offer, although only available to building-and-loan
members.73 But these limits were not generally raised until 1981, 74 even though
building-and-loan societies could make FHA loans at higher LTVRs as early as
1939 .7
Prior to the introduction of FRA insurance, Connecticut savings banks
could make loans of up to a 50% LTVR, with no specifications on term.7 6 By
1939, Connecticut savings banks could make loans of up to twenty-five years at
a 90% LTVR if insured by the FHA77 and a 66.7% LTVR if not insured."
Starting in 1945, Connecticut savings banks could make a limited number of
noninsured loans at an 8o% LTVR, but only with a twenty-year term.79 Not
until 1975 did Connecticut savings banks get general authorization to make an
unlimited number of uninsured 8o% LTVR loans8 ° -still below the 9o%
LTVR allowed for FHA-insured loans as early as 1939.
Connecticut regulators also took actions to limit loans made by insurance
companies. Prior to the introduction of FHA insurance, life insurance
companies were only allowed to make loans at a 50% LTVR.82 Although by
1939 the Connecticut Legislature had allowed life insurance companies to make
72. All other states deferred to the FHA's own determination of LTVRs and terms. The only
other state that appears to have placed particular restrictions on making FHA-insured loans
was Iowa, which limited FHA-insured loans to 25% of bank assets.
73. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4017 (1930).
74. Act of May 26, 1981, Pub. Act No. 81-193, 1981 Conn. Acts 236 (Reg. Sess.).
75- Undated Act Concerning Powers of Building and Loan Associations, ch. 85, 1939 Conn. Pub.
Acts 200.
76. CONN. GEN. STAT. 5 3999 (193o).
77. Undated Act Concerning Mortgage Loans Pursuant to the National Housing Act, ch. 43,
1939 Conn. Pub. Acts 107.
78. Undated Act Concerning Mortgages by Savings Banks, ch. 102, 1939 Conn. Pub. Acts 241.
79. Undated Act Authorizing Savings Banks To Invest in Mortgages, ch. 308, 1945 Conn. Pub.
Acts 986.
So. Act of May 28, 1975, Pub. Act No. 75-200, 1975 Conn. Acts 163 (Reg. Sess.).
81. State regulations limited the low-risk investments that insurance companies could make, so
mortgages often provided attractive investment options. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. S 4212
(1930) (placing limitations on life insurance company investments); infra note 139.
82. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4210 (1930).
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loans at a 66.7% LTVR, 3 it had also carved out an exception for any mortgage
insured by the FHA.8 ' There do not appear to have been limits on the terms of
life-insurance-financed loans.
For over three decades, these exemptions for insured loans only applied to
loans insured by the federal government, despite the fact that loans insured by
private parties would have protected banks equally. In 1969, the Connecticut
legislature finally passed exemptions for loans insured privately."'
At the state level as well as at the federal level, in order to take advantage of
the most favorable lending laws and open homeownership to the middle class,
banks and thrifts had to participate in the FHA insurance program. The tables
below summarize how exceptions for FHA insurance evolved at both the
federal level and in Connecticut from the introduction of the section 203(b)
86program in 1933 to 1969.
83. Undated Act Concerning Security for Loans Made by Domestic Life Insurance Companies,
ch. 287, 1937 Conn. Pub. Acts 925.
84. Undated Act Concerning Loans Pursuant to the National Housing Act, ch. 146, 1939 Conn.
Pub. Acts 357.
85. Act effective Oct. 1, 1969, Pub. Act. No. 265, 1969 Conn. Pub. Acts 277.
86. The tables stop in 1969 because a number of changes to the section 2o 3(b) program in the
mid-196os widely expanded access to FHA loans for previously excluded people (most
notably African-Americans) and places (most notably inner-city neighborhoods). See infra
Section IV.A.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
201
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Table i.
MAXIMUM LOAN-TO-VALUE RATIO, BY LENDER TYPE AND LOAN TYPE
87






















Agency max Agency max
This is the percentage of outstanding mortgage principal that the FHLBB would advance to thrifts
on security of a mortgage, not the LTVIR For FHLBB members, these limits exacerbated the
disparity between FHA-insured and non-FHA-insured mortgages. For example, if a Connecticut
building-and-loan originated a non-FHA-insured mortgage at the maximum 80% LTVR, the
FHLBB would advance up to 65% of the value of the mortgage-or 52% of the value of the home.
If that same building-and-loan originated an FHA-insured loan at the maximum 9o% LTVR, the
FHLBB would advance up to 9o% of the value of the mortgage-or 81% of the value of the home.
87. For material on national banks, see Housing Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-56o, § 1004, 78
Stat. 769, 807; and supra notes 49-58. For material on thrift advances, see Federal Home
Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 72-304, 5 10, 47 Stat. 725, 731-32 (1932); and supra note 66. For
material on Connecticut savings banks, see Act of June 9, 1965, Pub. Act No. 163, 1964-65
Conn. Pub. Acts 18o; Act effective Oct. 1, 1963, Pub. Act No. 118, 1963 Conn. Pub. Acts 185;
Act of Apr. 29, 1955, Pub. Act No. 39, 1955 Conn. Pub. Acts 37; and supra notes 75-78. For
material on Connecticut building and loans, see Act effective Oct. 1, 1963, Pub. Act No. 95,
1963 Conn. Pub. Acts 162; Act effective Oct. 1, 1959, Pub. Act No. 500, 1959 Conn. Pub. Acts
881; Undated Act Concerning F-A Mortgages by Building or Savings and Loan
Associations, Pub. Act No. 193, 1949 Conn. Pub. Acts 164; and supra notes 72, 74.
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** Where a range is given (here and in Table 2) the institution could make loans at the lower LTVR
(or shorter term) without limitation, but could only make loans at the higher LTVR (or longer
term) by meeting additional requirements. Also note that prior to the 195os, Connecticut building-
and-loans could only provide non-FHA-insured mortgages for their members.
"Agency max" (here and in Table 2) indicates that the legislature allowed the institution to
originate a mortgage with any LTVR (or term) permitted by the FHA. By 1945, maximum LTVR
was 9o%, and by 1969, 97%.
Table 2.
MAXIMUM TERM OF LOAN, BY LENDER TYPE AND LOAN TYPE
8 8
Non-FHA- 5 n/a n/a1933 Insured








FRA- Agency max 35 25
Insured
Non-FHA- 20 25 25
Insured
FHA- Agency max Agency max 25
Insured




Agency max Agency max 30
88. For material on national banks, see Housing Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-56o, § 1004, 78
Stat. 769, 807; and supra notes 49-58. For material on Connecticut savings banks, see Act
effective Oct. 1, 1969, Pub. Act No. 223, 1969 Conn. Pub. Acts 231; Act of Apr. 1, 1959, Pub.
Act No. 11, 1959 Conn. Pub. Acts 15; Act of Apr. 29, 1955, Pub. Act No. 39, 1955 Conn. Pub.
Acts 37; Undated Act Extending the Authorized Maturity of Mortgage Loans by the Federal
Housing Authority from Thirty to Thirty-Five Years, Pub. Act No. 97, 1947 Conn. Pub. Acts
73; and supra notes 76-79. For material on Connecticut building and loans, see Act effective
Oct. 1, 1963, Pub. Act. No. 415, 1963 Conn. Pub. Acts 607; and supra notes 72, 74.
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E. How Changing Banking Regulation Transformed the National Real Estate
Market
The high-LTVR, long-term loans made possible (and legal) through the
section 203(b) insurance program transformed mortgage lending and real
estate development. The number of new home starts in the country rapidly
increased from 93,000 in 1933, to 332,000 in 1937, to 619,ooo in 1941.89 These
new homes met a new market, as the section 203(b) program's lower down
payment requirements gready reduced the number of years of saving needed to
buy a home, expanding homeownership to younger age groups. Indeed, the
growth in homeownership from 46% in 1920 to 62% in 196o 90 came almost
entirely from purchasers under 6o; the rate of homeownership for those over
6o increased by only a few percentage points during this period.9'
In 1950, the census for the first time tracked American home finance in the
Residential Finance Survey. The resulting data offered a good sense of just
how much of a boon FHA-insured homes were to the homebuyer:
JACKSON, supra note 25, at 205.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 1.
Stern, supra note 23, at 282.
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Table 3.
MEDIAN FHA-INSURED AND CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGE, 195092
MOTGG, 190MRGG,15
Home Purchase Price $7900 $5600
Down Payment $1659 $1904
Loan Amount $6241 $3696
Loan-to-Value Ratio 79% 66%
Interest Rate 4.5% 5%
Term 20 years ii years
Monthly Payment $39.48 $3646
The median borrower with an FHA-insured mortgage put less money down
for a more valuable home than the average borrower with a conventional
mortgage, and then proceeded to make a similar monthly payment. Effectively,
FHA-insured buyers got better homes than conventional borrowers without
paying anything close to the full cost of the difference in quality. This disparity
reflects the regulatory differences that allowed FHA-insured loans to have
longer terms and lower down payments. Furthermore, an FHA-insured home
was much more likely to be a new home -59% of FHA-insured mortgages
outstanding in 195o had gone for new homes, compared with 23% of
conventional mortgages. 9 Most of those new homes were in the suburbs, the
place that would experience the greatest rate of property-value appreciation in
the coming decades and thus enable asset development. 94 In sum, America had
92. 4 BUREAU Or THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF HOUSING: 195o , pt. 1, at 42,
6o, 62 (1952) [hereinafter CENSUS OF HOUSING: 1950]. Monthly payment, loan amount, and
down payment figures are based on my calculations using these data. I multiplied the
median LTVR by the median purchase price. The resulting number is the loan amount on
the chart; the purchase price minus that number is the down payment on the chart. I
calculated the monthly payment using the standard function for amortizing a loan of the
amount on the chart over the median term.
93. Id. at 15.
94- It is quite possible that property-value appreciation in the suburbs was so strong because the
"self-fulfilling prophecy" of guaranteed FHA-insured loans built confidence among
developers and homebuyers and thus helped create a stronger market for suburban housing
than otherwise would have been possible. Suburban developers would often get preapproval
for FHA insurance for entire subdivisions and use that as a selling point for homebuyers. See
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two housing markets from 1934 until the mid-196os: a conventional market,
with tight regulations on loan terms and down payments, and an effectively
unregulated market of loans insured by the FHA, allowing extremely liberal
loan terms and miniscule down payments.
III. HOW THE BANKING SAFETY-AND-SOUNDNESS CHANGES HURT
AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS
A. Discrimination in Section 203(b)
These data, and the power of banking regulation in creating separate
markets for FHA-insured and conventional mortgages that they demonstrate,
raise two critical questions. First, why did the American housing market not
comport with the semi-strong form of the efficient capital markets
hypothesis,9" which predicts that interest rate and down payment differences
should have been immediately capitalized into higher home prices ?96 Contrary
to the theory of efficient markets, monthly payments remained lower for FHA-
insured homes than for non-FHA-insured homes, even though the FHA-
insured homes tended to be newer and of better quality. Second, given the lack
of such capitalization, why would anyone choose a conventional mortgage over
an FHA-insured mortgage?
Both of these questions hint at the serious problem caused by having
safety-and-soundness regulations that, in effect, gave a monopoly to the FHA
for most of the American first-time homebuyer market. Many would argue that
such a government monopoly is bad enough simply because monopolies
generally raise prices and discourage innovation. 97 But, even worse, the
government monopoly created by the FHA refused to offer its product to wide
swaths of the American population, thus creating separate mortgage markets in
JACKSON, supra note 25, at 205. The phrase "self-fulfilling prophecy" is from a quotation by
noted urbanist Jane Jacobs. Id. at 214.
95. The efficient capital markets hypothesis generally posits that prices in a market will
immediately adjust to reflect available information. The weak form argues that this
hypothesis only is true for the most basic information: past market performance of the asset.
The semi-strong form of the hypothesis, which is the most accepted version, states that the
market price of a good will reflect all publicly available information. The strong form argues
that all information, even nonpublic information, is reflected in the price of an asset. See,
e.g., STEPHENA. RosS ETAL., CORPORATE FINANCE 319-35 (5th ed. 1999).
96. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 45-49 (2o1).
97. See, e.g., KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC TEORY AND COMMON LAW
EVOLUTION 13 (2003) (describing the conventional theory of deadweight loss from
monopoly).
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urban neighborhoods and for African-Americans. People excluded by the FHA
had to find a way to afford the steep down payment and higher monthly
payments needed for conventional mortgages, or give up the dream of
homeownership.
The discriminatory policies of the FHA in its first three decades of existence
are well known. As Kenneth Jackson has described, HOLC rated every urban
and suburban neighborhood in America as "A," "B," "C," or "D" quality, color
coding maps of every metropolitan area ("D," or lowest quality, was colored
red-the origin of the term "redlining").98 Quality ratings were based on age
and type of housing stock, but also very much on race. "A" neighborhoods had
to be "homogenous" -meaning "American business and professional men"-
and "American"- meaning white and often, native-born.99 Predominantly
black neighborhoods received a "D" grade. °° HOLC did not use these
categories as major criteria for distribution of its loans; indeed, in many
counties HOLC made loans mainly in "C" and "D" areas.'' This wide
distribution of loans proved to be a good business decision for HOLC; often,
residents of "C" and "D" areas had lower rates of default than residents of "A"
and "B" areas.'
0 2
The FHA, in contrast, used the HOLC system as a basis for developing
criteria to select which loans it would insure. It set up a pseudoscientific rating
system for neighborhoods, in which 6o% of the available points were awarded
based on "relative economic stability" and "protection from adverse
influences" - both code words for segregation.' 3 "If a neighborhood is to
retain stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by
the same social and racial classes," the FHA's Underwriting Manual
98. JACKSON, supra note 25, at 197.
99. Id.
1o. Id. at 198.
1o. Id. at 202. I found that in New Haven, HOLC in its first year of existence made 4.2% of its
loans in the "D" rated neighborhood of Dixwell. Grantee Index to Land Records for 1933 (on
file with New Haven Hall of Records). This rate is similar to the historical rate of lending by
major banks in New Haven in Dixwell. See infra text accompanying notes 136-137.
Generally, I calculated data in this Note on loans in Dixwell by first examining every
mortgage originated by the relevant lender in the stated year. I then determined how many
of these mortgages were within the boundaries of the Dixwell neighborhood, as defined by
the area bounded by Winchester Avenue, Orchard Street, Henry Avenue, Lake Place, and
Goffe Street. I then looked closely at these mortgages in DixweU to filter out commercial
mortgages. Note that the grantee indexes for later years (i.e., all years I examined after 1914)
appear to provide somewhat more reliable records in differentiating between new residential
mortgages and other transactions. Because I closely screened the mortgages in Dixwell, the
percentages for all years are conservative, and likely particularly conservative for 1912-1914.
102. JACKSON, supra note 25, at 202.
103. Id. at 207.
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counseled."°4 The FHA strongly suggested racial covenants as a means of
protecting against such transitions.0 5 Furthermore, FHA underwriting
standards frowned upon homes with rental units or storeso 6 (historically most
of the homeownership stock in urban neighborhoods), favoring instead single-
family homes in single-use neighborhoods.
The FHA's underwriting standards reflected the model of neighborhood
change developed by economist Homer Hoyt.107 In this model, neighborhoods
started out new and white. Over time, housing stock deteriorated, and the
neighborhood transitioned from white Protestant to Jewish and finally black.
The F-A assigned every neighborhood a place somewhere along this
supposedly inevitable continuum."'
The FHA's standards, however, ignored countervailing realities of
neighborhood integration and change. In the early twentieth century, as
Richard Sander has described, "[a]lthough many cities . . . had 'Negro
districts,' most blacks lived outside these districts; .... .[A]s late as 1910,
housing segregation was one of the least significant problems facing blacks." 9
And even when neighborhoods did become segregated, their values did not
necessarily decline as they transitioned from white to black. A comprehensive
study of racial transition in seven cities from 1943 to 1955 that carefully
separated race from other factors found that "the entry of nonwhites into
previously all-white neighborhoods was much more often associated with price
improvement or stability than with price weakening.... Even Hoyt himself
cautioned that race was so often conflated with other neighborhood
characteristics that race could not be seen simply as an independent factor
driving changes in neighborhood value.'
104. Id. at 2o8.
ios. Id.
1o6. Id. at 207-08.
107. Hoyt published an initial study explaining these theories in 1933. Later, the FHA hired Hoyt
to conduct a follow-up study that reiterated these ideas. See CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN
NEIGHBORS: A STUDYOF PREJUDICE IN HOUSING 16o-6i (Kennikat Press 1971) (1955).
108. JACKSON, supra note 25, at 198.
1o9. Richard H. Sander, Comment, Individual Rights and Demographic Realities: The Problem of
Fair Housing, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 874, 876-77 (1988).
io. LUIGI LAURENTI, PROPERTY VALUES AND RACE: STUDIES IN SEVEN CITIES 47 (1961). As
Richard Brooks suggested in a conversation with me, these data may overstate the case
because realtors inflated prices as blacks first moved in to some neighborhoods in the 195os,
with prices falling back to true market levels soon after. Still, several additional studies over
a range of time periods cast serious doubt on the FHA's assertion that blacks moving in
inevitably led to price decline. See id. at S3.
mii. SeeABRAMs, supra note 107, at 16l.
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The FHA ignored these complex realities, making simple racial
categorizations both by grading neighborhoods based on racial composition
and by encouraging racial covenants. With these brightline rules, the FHA
encouraged housing segregation, much as municipal racial-zoning laws
mandated segregation before the Supreme Court invalidated these laws in
1917.1
2
B. The Results of Discrimination in Section 203 (b)
The FHA's underwriting criteria resulted in much lower rates of lending in
urban neighborhoods than in suburban neighborhoods. For example, Jackson
found that 91% of a sample of homes insured by the FHA in metropolitan St.
Louis from 1935 to 1939 were located in the suburbs. '
In addition, these criteria resulted in much lower rates of lending to
nonwhites than to whites, even when compared with the market as a whole.
Only 2.3% of FHA-insured mortgages outstanding in 1950 were for nonwhites,
while 5.o% of conventional mortgages were for nonwhites. 114 Furthermore, the
few loans that were made to nonwhites were for properties of below-average
value. The median purchase price of nonwhite-purchased properties in the
FHA insurance program in 1950 was under $6ooo; 5 for all properties in the
112. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (holding that such laws violated the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866). Sander notes that many cities continued to
pass such laws throughout the 192os, and the laws continued to be enforced because few
lawsuits were brought challenging them. Sander, supra note lo9, at 878.
113. JACKSON, supra note 25, at 209.
114. See CENSUS OF HOUSING: 1950, supra note 92, pt. 1, at 164. This measure did not include
loans for which race was not reported, or loans on multifamily units, for which racial data
were not provided. Note, however, that over 95% of all FHA-insured loans were on single-
family units. See id., pt. 1, at 60, 164. This trend continued in the 196o census, with only
2.5% of the FHA-insured mortgages going to nonwhite households, even though nonwhites
held 5.4% of conventional mortgages overall. See 5 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, CENSUS OF HOUSING: 1960, pt. 1, at 1o (1963) [hereinafter CENSUS OF
HOUSING: 196o]. The trend reversed by 1970. See 5 BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, CENSUS OF HOUSING: 1970, at 77 (1973) [hereinafter CENSUS OF HOUSING:
1970]. The transformation of the FHA program into one that insured above-market levels of
mortgages for nonwhites is detailed further below. See infra Section IV.A.
115. CENSUS OF HOUSING: 1950, supra note 92, pt. i, at 31o. The method of aggregating data does
not provide an exact median. The information by race measures only owner-occupied, single-
family properties, while the data I have been using otherwise include owner-occupied,
multifamily properties; however, the overall median purchase prices for FHA-insured
properties in the two categories are the same, probably because only 4% of FHA-insured
mortgages on owner-occupied properties went to multifamily homes (as compared with 17.50/0
of conventionally financed mortgages on owner-occupied properties). Id., pt. i, at 60.
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program, the equivalent value was $7900.116 This disparity reflects differences
in income between white and nonwhite buyers in the FHA program; the
median family income of all buyers with outstanding FHA-insured loans in
1950 was $44oo, while the figure for nonwhites was closer to $3500.117
One might speculate that the disparity between the conventional market's
rate of lending to nonwhites and the FHA-insured market's rate of lending to
nonwhites reflects discrimination based on income, not race. Because
nonwhites on average had lower incomes than whites, discrimination based on
income alone would result in fewer nonwhites getting FHA-insured loans.
However, from the limited data available on this point, it does not appear
to be the case that the FHA program provided fewer opportunities for lower-
income households than the market as a whole. While the median household
income of a household receiving a conventional mortgage was lower than the
median for a household receiving an FHA-insured mortgage,"' it appears that
this gap may have come mostly or entirely from higher rates of lending
through the FHA insurance program inside metropolitan areas (as opposed to
rural areas). 9
Similarly, some might see the FHA's racial policies as solely trying to
minimize the risk of default. But faced with the contradictory example of
HOLC's program, in which default rates were lower on lower-grade, urban
homes, 20 and the empirical evidence that race alone did not determine home
value, 2' such a justification appears tenuous at best. Even if there had been
some additional risk in insuring urban homes, or those occupied by blacks, the
FHA had already decided that it would be willing to take on the massive
additional risks associated with making low-down-payment, long-term
116. See supra table accompanying note 92.
117. Compare CENSUS OF HOUSING: 1950, supra note 92, pt. 1, at 165 (showing median family
income of all buyers with outstanding FHA-insured loans), with id. at 310 (showing figures
for nonwhites). The figures for nonwhites do not permit an exact median to be calculated,
and as such I have given the midpoint of the range in which the median lies. This difference
may also reflect the fact that the FHA insured loans for blacks only in black neighborhoods
because of its policy of racial stability. See supra text accompanying note 104. In some cases,
black neighborhoods may have had homes worth less than homes in white neighborhoods.
118. CENSUS OF HOUSING: 1950, supra note 92, pt. 1, at 165 (illustrating that the median income
for conventional mortgages was $3700, but for FIA-insured mortgages it was $44oo). In
196o, the median for conventional mortgages was $650o, but for FHA-insured mortgages it
was $6900. CENSUS OF HOUSING: 1960, supra note 114, pt. I, at 9.
119. For mortgages inside standard metropolitan statistical areas (core urban areas and their
surrounding suburbs) in 196o, both FHA-insured mortgages and conventional mortgages
served households with a median income of $7000. CENSUS OF HOUSING: 196o, supra note
114, pt. i, at 39. Similar data are not presented in the 1950 Census.
120. See supra text accompanying note lO2.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 11o-111.
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loans." It is hard to characterize the FHA's view of blacks and urban
neighborhoods as anything but outright discrimination.
C. The Combined Effect of Section 203(b) Discrimination and Safety-and-
Soundness Regulations
Historians and legal scholars have debated the effect of discrimination in
the section 20 3(b) program, especially since Kenneth Jackson's research
appeared in 1985.123 For some commentators, the fact that the federal
government discriminated in the FHA insurance program, and that the
program was so massive, already defines it as a major driver of racial
differences in asset accumulation 1 4 and the racial segregation characteristic of
post-World War II America.
2 s
But other scholars have asserted that the role of the section 203(b) program
has been overblown and that the real forces behind segregation and a lack of
asset accumulation for blacks were private discriminatory preferences.126
Behind this doubt lies a fundamental question: If there was money to be made
in insuring home mortgages against loss for African-Americans, and in urban
neighborhoods, why didn't private insurers enter those markets ?127
Because no strong explanation for the failure of a private market to develop
has emerged in the literature to date, these scholars' claims of the limited role
of the section 203(b) program have seemed quite plausible to serious
122. See supra Section lI.B.
13. See, e.g., Daniel J. Hutch, The Rationale for Including Disadvantaged Communities in the Smart
Growth Metropolitan Development Framework, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 353, 357 (2002);
Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and Policy:
Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 13o8-o9 (1995); David Dante
Troutt, Ghettoes Made Easy: The Metamarket/Antimarket Dichotomy and the Legal Challenges of
Inner-City Economic Development, 35 HARV. C.RI-C.L. L. REv. 427,439 (2000).
124. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
125. Edward L. Glaeser & Jacob L. Vigdor, Racial Segregation: Promising News, in 1 REDEFINING
URBAN AND SUBURBAN AMERCA: EVIDENCE FROM CENSUS 2000, at 211, 217 (Bruce Katz &
Robert E. Lang eds., 2003) (noting that in 2000 the average African-American resident of an
urban area in the United States lived in a census tract that was 51% black). While Glaeser
and Vigdor find segregation declining overall, they also find that 65% of blacks would still
have to move in order for all metropolitan-area census tracts to reflect the same racial
composition as metropolitan areas as a whole. See id. at 217, 234.
126. See, e.g., Paul Boudreaux, An Individual Preference Approach to Suburban Racial Desegregation,
27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 533, 544 (1999); Robert Ellickson, Professor, Yale Law Sch., Remarks
at Panel on Causes of Residential Segregation (Mar. 25, 1988), in THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
AFTER TWENTY YEARS: A CONFERENCE AT YALE LAW SCHOOL, MARCH 1988, at 58-59 (Robert
G. Schwemm ed., 1989).
127. I thank Professor Ellickson for posing this question to me in conversation.
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economists. Some might claim that the FHA's presence in the market
represented a government subsidy that blocked the development of a private
market. Indeed, no private insurer could match the government's self-
insurance capacity: the use of the general treasury to insure against the small,
but very expensive, risk of a massive crash in housing prices."' But the FHA's
program was run, and continues to be run, as a profitable government
enterprise. For over fifty years, the FHA made a profit every year on the
insurance programs; in 2001, the insurance find's net assets were valued at $18
billion.'29 And the half-percent charge (on top of the usual interest payment
that the bank received) initially set for FHA insurance was commensurate with
what the market price had been for the failed private insurers of the 1920S. 13'
Furthermore, the eventual development of a new private mortgage insurance
market in the 1950s and 196os, once safety-and-soundness regulations began
to be relaxed, shows that the government subsidy, if there was one, was not
large enough to keep the private sector out of the market.' 3'
One might also think that the collapse of the private sector mortgage
insurance market in the early 1930S made both investors and regulators wary of
entering that market. But the fact that California authorized private mortgage
insurance in 1935 seems to disprove that theory, at least from the regulatory
perspective.1 3  One would think that if African-Americans and urban
neighborhoods presented viable markets to enter, private insurers would have
taken advantage of such authorizing legislation. Yet no firms entered the
128. Reinvention of HUD and Redirection of Housing Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous.
Opportunity and Cmy. Dev. and the Subcomm. on HUD Oversight and Structure of the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, lo 4 th Cong. 420-23 (1995) (statement of
Stephen Moore, Director of Fiscal Policy Studies, Cato Institute).
iU9. BRUCE E. FOOTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT No. RS2o530, FHA LOAN INSURANCE
PROGRAM: AN OVERVIEW 4 (2003).
130. RAPKIN ETAL., supra note 34, at 25.
131. For a comprehensive overview of the private mortgage insurance market and its relation to
FHA insurance, see Quinin Johnstone, Private Mortgage Insurance, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
783 (2004). Today, private mortgage insurance generally costs less than FHA insurance,
though perhaps part of that cost difference comes from the FHA insuring riskier buyers. Id.
at 786.
132. See Insurance Code, div. 2, pt. 6, ch. 2, 1935 Cal. Star. 496. Note that private mortgage
insurers were, at least in some cases, subject to restrictions similar to the banking industry.
The California insurance legislation allowed private mortgage insurers to insure only
mortgages with up to a 6o% LTVR. Id. at 747-78. In any event, such restrictions in private
mortgage insurance regulations were unimportant. The regulatory restrictions imposed by
banking regulators still would have stopped private insurers from guaranteeing high-LTVR,
long-term loans, because no bank would have been able to originate such loans without
FHA insurance.
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market until the Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation opened its doors
in the late 1950S.133
One explanation retains its strength: The private mortgage insurance
market for low-down-payment, high-LTVR loans for blacks and in urban
neighborhoods failed to develop because such loans were illegal unless insured
by the FHA. In effect, Congress and state legislatures incorporated internal
agency guidelines set by the FHA into statutes that shaped the entire mortgage
market. Quite possibly, they did so without any intention of creating a massive
system of discrimination that could not be broken up by outside competition.
Rather than a comprehensive argument for transforming the mortgage market,
the proposition to legislators was simply that banks' safety and soundness were
not threatened by loans that the federal government would pay in case of
default. Whether intentionally discriminatory or not, these legislative barriers
provide a major reason to believe that government policies were responsible for
a greater share of post-World War II racial segregation and disinvestment in
urban areas than previously thought.
D. The Combined Effect of Section 203(b) Discrimination and Safety-and-
Soundness Regulations: One City's Experience
My study of residential mortgages in New Haven, Connecticut illustrates
how the combination of section 203(b) discrimination against urban
neighborhoods and safety-and-soundness regulations transformed housing
finance markets.
Before the Depression, New Haven banks made short-term, low-LTVR
loans. Families made up the difference between these loans and the purchase
price of their homes with savings and second mortgages from private
lenders."M These patterns held across the city. Because lenders were only
exposing themselves, in aggregate, to at most around two-thirds of the value of
the house due to low LTVRs, they tended to issue standardized loan types
regardless of neighborhood, based on family income. Even the city's largest,
most prominent lending institutions were active in poor urban neighborhoods.
For example, from 1912-1914, Connecticut Savings Bank made 7.7% of its
transactions in Dixwell, a working-class urban neighborhood with a large black
population; 13 5 New Haven Savings Bank made 5.2% of its transactions in
133. RAPKIN ETAL., supra note 34, at 38.
134. See Marshall, supra note 21, at 65. Marshall found that 46% of all mortgages made in New
Haven in 1911 were second mortgages. Id.
135. ROBERT AUSTIN WARNER, NEW HAVEN NEGROES: A SocIAL HISTORY 196 (Arno Press 1969)
(1940).
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Dixwell.', 6 In 1936, as the FHA section 203(b) program was just starting, 5.6%
of all loans made by Connecticut Savings Bank and 4.9% of those made by
New Haven Savings Bank went to residential properties in Dixwell. 137
By 1954, the entire structure of the New Haven lending market had
radically changed. Less than 1% of loans from Connecticut Savings Bank and
New Haven Savings Bank went to residential properties in Dixwell. 38 The
savings banks and competing prime-market institutions such as life insurance
companies'3 9 had become highly specialized lending institutions, providing one
product: fully amortized loans at 4% to 5%, with terms of up to twenty-five
years. They originated mortgages primarily in certain neighborhoods that met
FHA requirements, like the racially homogenous, single-family neighborhoods
of Beaver Hills, Morris Cove, and Westville. '0
Meanwhile, other institutions stepped in to provide new, higher-cost loans
for markets not served by the major savings banks. For example, Branford
Federal Savings and Loan offered loans at a 6% interest rate for a fifteen-year
term, generally with LTVRs of 6o% to 70%. They made 7.1% of their loans in
Dixwell in 1954. Most of their other loans were in older New Haven
neighborhoods like the Hill and Fair Haven, which were not well served by the
major savings banks. 41
This system shows on the ground level how it was cheaper to buy a newer,
more valuable home in an FHA-approved neighborhood than to buy an older
home in a neighborhood like Dixwell. An example can be seen by comparing
the following two mortgages, both made in June 1954, one by Connecticut
Savings Bank with FHA insurance and one by Branford Federal Savings and
Loan without FHA insurance.
136. Grantee Index to Land Records for 1912-1914 (on file with New Haven Hall of Records). See
supra note loi for an explanation of how I made these calculations.
137. Grantee Index to Land Records for 1936 (on file with New Haven Hall of Records).
138. Grantee Index to Land Records for 1954 (on file with New Haven Hall of Records).
139. For example, Prudential Insurance originated about thirty mortgages in 1954, all in the
relatively upscale Westville, Whitney Avenue, and Foxon areas of the city. Grantee Index to
Land Records for 1954 (on file with New Haven Hall of Records).
140. DOUGLAS W. RAE, CITY: URBANISM AND ITS END 267-68 (2003).
141. These neighborhoods were mainly graded "D" by the HOLC-derived rating system used by
the FHA. Id. at 269-70.
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Table 4.
SAMPLE FHA-INSURED AND CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGES IN NEW HAVEN, 195442
Home Purchase $12500 $11500
Price
Down Payment $28o $4000
Loan Amount $9700 $7500
Loan-to-Value Ratio 776% 65.2%
Interest Rate 4.5% 6%
Term 20 yearS 15 years
Monthly Payment $614o $63.29
The home on Pond Lily Avenue (near the suburban border) cost more than
the home on Lombard Street (in urban Fair Haven), but the buyer of the Pond
Lily Avenue home put a lower down payment on the home and paid less per
month for a mortgage, because of the lower interest rate and longer term.
The overlapping effect of having some neighborhoods with low-cost
mortgages available only to whites (because the FHA would insure them on
those terms) and other, FHA-redlined neighborhoods with high-cost
mortgages encouraged racial segregation in New Haven, and perhaps many
other cities. Buying homes in inner-city neighborhoods became irrational for
buyers with access to FHA insurance. Meanwhile, blacks and those who
wanted to keep living in older neighborhoods continued to struggle to save for
large down payments, and to qualify for loans with shorter terms and thus
higher monthly payments. Because most of these families could not afford the
substantial down payments, exclusion from the section 203(b) program often
meant elimination from the entire housing market.
142. Mortgage from Gilbert C. and Eleanor C. Earl to The New Haven Savings Bank (executed
June 21, 1954) (on file with New Haven Hall of Records, Land Records, vol. 1814, p. 393);
Mortgage from Benjamin and Kate Beck to Branford Federal Savings & Loan Association
(executed June 23, 1954) (on file with New Haven Hall of Records, Land Records, vol. 1814,
p. 511). Term, down payment, and LTVR are from my calculations using these records.
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IV. ENDING FHA REDLINING: WHY THE REMEDY DID NOT MATCH
THE HARM
A. Opening Up Section 203(b)
The FHA ended its racially discriminatory policies gradually. From 1948 to
1962, the FHA moved from active preference for racially homogenous
neighborhoods and developments with racial covenants to a supposedly neutral
policy of insuring homes whether or not they were open to purchase by blacks.
In 1962, President Kennedy issued an Executive Order that took the next step,
actively refusing FHA insurance to anyone who would not sell homes to blacks.
In 1948, the Supreme Court held in Shelley v. Kraemer that courts could not
enforce racial covenants. 43 If courts could not enforce racial covenants, surely
government agencies could not actively use racial covenants as a criterion for
deciding where to insure mortgages. But it took the FHA a year to react to
Shelley. When it did, it announced that its policy would not change until
February 15, 1950, giving builders a sufficient amount of time to file covenants
and secure FHA insurance for projects already planned.'44
Even after the FHA stopped using race as a direct criterion, it left
developers to choose whether they wanted to impose racial restrictions on their
own -a practice generally legal and frequently employed' 45 until the passage of
the Fair Housing Act of 1968.146 The head of the FHA stated: "The role of the
Federal Government in the housing programs is to assist, to stimulate, to lead,
and sometimes to prod, but never to dictate or coerce, and never to stifle the
proper exercise of private and local responsibility." 47 In practice, leaving the
choice to discriminate to developers produced the same results as explicitly
including race as a criterion: Only 2.5% of FHA-insured loans reported in the
196o census went to nonwhites.' 48 And of new homes insured by the FHA
143. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
144. JACKSON, supra note 25, at 208.
145. For example, as late as 196o, "[o]nly one tract of new private housing available for Negro
ownership ... [had] been built in the New Haven area in recent years. It consist[ed] of a
few houses.., in West Haven... offered at $14,9oo by a Negro builder." CHESTER RAPKIN,
THE ECONOMIC FEAsmILITY OF URBAN RENEWAL IN THE DixwELL AREA: A REPORT TO THE
NEw HAVEN REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY 119 (196o). Legendary builder William Levitt refused
to sell to blacks as late as 1963 in his Belair development in Maryland. Geoffrey Mohan,
Levit's Defenses of Racist Policies, NEWSDAY, Sept. 28, 1997, at H18.
146. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII (Fair Housing), 5§ 8oi-819, 82 Stat.
73, 81-89 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2000)).
147. Letter from Albert Cole, Adm'r, Hous. & Home Fin. Agency, to Senator Prescott Bush, in
102 CONG. REC. lO,746 (1956).
148. CENSUS OF HOUSING: 196o, supra note 114, pt. i, at 1O.
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from 1949 to 1959, less than 2% were available for sale to nonwhites- and even
that paltry number came mainly from all-black developments.'
49
One commentator explains the continuation of discriminatory results
despite FHA "neutrality" by referring back to the "self-fulfilling prophecy"
created by the adoption of Hoyt's model of neighborhood change by the FHA
and other market actors. The longstanding belief among developers, realtors,
and homebuyers, backed by the FHA, that racial transition was a harbinger of
neighborhood decline induced all these actors to try to keep neighborhoods
white. In doing so, they made Hoyt's false assumption increasingly true.15 0
Drawing on Robert Ellickson's work on the power of social norms, Carol Rose
has argued that "[w]hen nudged along by judicial recognition, norms become
law, in the formal as well as the informal sense."'' After the FHA had helped
establish a norm of racial segregation in housing in its early era of explicit
discrimination, it continued to recognize discriminatory housing practices by
developers through "neutrally" insuring homes with discrimination clauses,
allowing the norm of segregation to continue as law.
President Kennedy finally truly ended redlining in the FHA's core section
203 (b) program by signing Executive Order 1,o62 on November 20, 1962.12
The Executive Order recognized that "discriminatory policies and practices
based upon race, color, creed, or national origin now operate to deny many
Americans the benefits of housing financed through Federal assistance," 3 and
directed "all departments and agencies in the executive branch of the Federal
Government, insofar as their functions relate to the provision, rehabilitation, or
operation of housing and related facilities, to take all action necessary and
appropriate to prevent discrimination because of race, color, creed, or national
origin" s4 in a series of areas including "loans hereafter insured, guaranteed, or
otherwise secured by the credit of the Federal Government."' The action was
the only one needed to make the FHA change its underwriting practices,
149. U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FORALL 171 (abr. ed. 1959).
150. LAURENTI, supra note I1o, at 25-26.
151. Carol Rose, Property Stories: Shelley v. Kraemer, in PROPERTY STORIES 169, 198 (Gerald
Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2004).
152. Exec. Order No. 11,o63, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1959-1963), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(2000) (amended version also includes sex, disability, and familial status as protected
classes).
153. Id. at 652.
154. Id. § l1, at 653.
15S. Id. § lol(a)(iii), at 653.
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because its discrimination resulted from administrative policy, not legislative
requirement."6
Indeed, the F-A dramatically changed its practices, going from making
2.5% of its loans to nonwhites in 196o-far below the rate of the market as a
whole-to 12.5% in 197o and 19.8% in 198o, both far above the rate of the
market as a whole.' One commentator notes that by 1969, "FHA's standard
mortgage program had become increasingly... an active tool of social policy
by directing homeownership and affordable private-market rental
opportunities to low-income households in inner-city neighborhoods."
11 8
B. Why Ending Redlining Was Not Enough
Integrating the section 203(b) program had less impact on the overall
housing market in 1969 than it might have had a decade or two earlier. By
1969, the FHA's market share had fallen from a high of 45% of all new homes
financed in the 1940S to just 14%."'x The FHA's falling market share reflected
private market innovation, enabled by the gradual relaxation of safety-and-
soundness requirements. In 1957, the Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Company
became the first company to develop a modem system of private mortgage
insurance.16' By the late 196os, some legislatures removed the statutory
distinctions between FHA insurance and private mortgage insurance. 6' But
others did not, perhaps because these distinctions now mattered little:
National and state lenders could make loans regardless of mortgage insurance
at increasingly high LTVRs and for long terms.162
The integration of section 203(b) and the many reforms to the housing
market that followed-from the Fair Housing Act of 1968163 to the Community
156. The 1934 Housing Act delegated the details of the section 203(b) program to the FHA
administrator, simply requiring a basic finding that mortgages were "economically sound."
National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, § 203(c), 48 Stat. 1246, 1248-49 (1934).
157. CENSUS OF HOUSING: 196o, supra note 114, Pt. 1, at io; CENSUS OF HOUSING: 1970, supra
note 114, at 77; 5 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF HOUSING:
198o, at 24 (1983). For 197o and 198o, mortgages with no reported data on race are not
included in calculations.
158. Kerry D. Vandell, FHA Restrucuring Proposals: Alternatives and Implications, 6 HOUSING
POL'Y DEBATE 299, 320 (1995).
159. Id. at 308-09 tbl.i.2.
16o. Id. at 314 n.6.
i6. See supra text accompanying note 85.
162. See supra Sections II.B-D.
163. 42 U.S.C. 5§ 36O-3619 (2000).
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Reinvestment Act of 1977164_ put blacks on nearly equal terms with whites in
buying a home. 6 ' But was equal really enough? For three decades, FHA
policies, combined with safety-and-soundness regulations, had given strong
preference to whites over blacks in becoming homeowners and building assets.
To simply level the playing field ignored that in the intervening decades whites
had been able to gain wealth and opportunities through homeownership that
gave them a distinct advantage over blacks. This advantage may have
continued to transfer over time, considering that wealth from homeownership
is often passed down from generation to generation, 66  and that
homeownership confers strong human capital benefits on children, such as
providing access to quality school systems. 67
In addition to the financial and human capital effects of the thirty-year
head start that whites had on blacks in accumulating capital through
homeownership, the FHA's policies reshaped how Americans conceived of
residential segregation. The FHA's acceptance of the Hoyt model of
neighborhood change made Americans think of residential segregation as the
norm, even though in the early twentieth century that had not been the case.1
6 8
It also made Americans conceive of racial change as leading to a decline in
property values, thus inspiring the ubiquitous, panicked selling when blacks
started to move into neighborhoods, 69 even though it was not necessarily the
case that property values actually declined. 7 ° While the FHA could have
actively challenged the rise of neighborhood segregation in the racial zoning
ordinances of the 191os and 1920s and the pseudoscience of economists like
Hoyt, it instead helped institutionalize neighborhood segregation. The harms
164. 12 U.S.C. § 2901-29o8 (2000).
165. However, serious questions exist about whether these laws as currently enforced sufficiently
level the housing market. See, e.g., WHY THE POOR PAY MORE: How To STOP PREDATORY
LENDING (Gregory D. Squires ed., 2004); Susan Wachter, Price Revelation and Efficient
Mortgage Markets, 82 TEX. L. REV. 413 (2003).
166. See Steven F. Venti & David A. Wise, Aging and Housing Equity: Another Look (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8608, 2001), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w86o8. Venti and Wise argue that wealth from
homeownership is particularly susceptible to intergenerational transfers because elderly
people are less likely to divest their housing before death than their more liquid assets. But
see Michael D. Hurd, Bequests: By Accident or by Design?, in DEATH AND DOLLARS: THE ROLE
OF GtFTs AND BEQUESTS IN AMERjCA 93, 112-13 (Alicia H. Munnell & Annika Sund~n eds.,
2003) (suggesting that housing may be divested at a rate similar to that of other assets).
167. See, e.g., Nancy A. Denton, Housing as a Means of Asset Accumulation: A Good Strategy for the
Poor?, in ASSETS FOR THE POOR, supra note 4, at 232, 234-35.
168. Sander, supra note 1O9, at 876-77.
169. See, e.g., W. EDWARD ORSER, BLOCKBUSTING IN BALTIMORE: THE EDMONSON VILLAGE STORY
102-17 (1994).
170. See supra text accompanying note 1io.
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of residential segregation have been well explained.'71 Many of these harms can
be attributed to the FHA's role in making residential segregation the norm in
American culture.
C. Potential Remedies
Simply making FHA insurance available on an equal basis did not undo the
past harms caused to blacks who missed out on a generation of wealth-
building, nor did it address the ongoing harms caused by the FHA's
institutionalization of neighborhood segregation. Several articles, books,
statutes, and cases provide ideas for actions that could increase the
opportunities available to blacks for access to wealth through homeownership,
changes that could help desegregate neighborhoods. I do not claim to offer a
full explanation or investigation of such actions, particularly with regard to the
issues raised by constitutional limits on affirmative action programs. I simply
wish to point out a few actions for which my findings on the combined effect
of safety-and-soundness regulation and FHA discrimination may provide
additional justification.
To ameliorate wealth disparities in the housing market, Richard Sander has
suggested "mobility grants" - direct payments or mortgage subsidies to
individual blacks. He suggests that such wealth-building actions could also be
used to address neighborhood segregation by offering such grants on a
preferential basis to African-Americans "willing to move into predominantly
white neighborhoods." 172 Sander mentions the FHA program as critical to
making the case for the program's legality under affirmative action doctrine,
seeing the grants as "very direct amends for the widespread exclusion of blacks
from the federal mortgage subsidies."1 73 My research provides additional
justification for Sander's suggestions, as courts or legislators would likely want
an explanation for why blacks were not able to access similar opportunities
outside the FHA program in order to see that program as sufficient to justify
affirmative action.
Payments of the type Sander proposes may be of particular interest to those
who support providing reparations to African-Americans. As Keith Hylton has
argued, significant barriers may exist to claims based on slavery and other
historical injustices, notably the lack of surviving plaintiffs directly injured by
rp. See, e.g., DAVID RUSK, INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME: WINNING STRATEGIES FOR SAVING
URBAN AMERICA (1999); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD
OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996); john a. powell, Opportunity-Based Housing, 12 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 188 (2003).
172. Sander, supra note lo9, at 928.
173. Id. at 930.
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the practice and the related difficulty of proving proximate cause in a tort
suit. 17 4 In contrast, the relatively recent timeframe of the discrimination in the
section 203(b) program means there are many living people who were directly
harmed-indeed, many more people than, for example, in the current litigation
over the Tulsa race riot of 1921.171 My research might help explain (and,
through the census data and land records research, quantify) the nature of that
harm.
Anti-exclusionary zoning litigation and legislation may also find new
support from my research. For three decades, activists and attorneys have
attempted to use the courts and the political system to create further housing
opportunities in communities with restrictive zoning. These initiatives at least
have the potential to undo the pattern of racial residential segregation that the
FHA helped create.176 Notable decisions and actions have included the Mount
Laurel series of cases mandating that each town in New Jersey provide some
level of affordable housing;' 7 a Pennsylvania case limiting the ability of towns
to zone for large-lot homes;178 state legislation in Massachusetts allowing
developers to sue towns that do not set aside land for affordable housing
construction; 179 and local legislation in places from Montgomery County,
Maryland to Davis, California giving developers bonus density in exchange for
building affordable housing."' Courts and legislatures may find additional
justification for such actions if they understand that state action provided
essential support for residential segregation. In adopting a view of inevitable
neighborhood racial change and racial segregation as the norm, the FHA
reversed a history of integrated neighborhoods with stable housing values,
creating a different reality that continues to influence housing patterns today.
174. Keith N. Hylton, A Framework for Reparations Claims, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 31, 38
(2004).
175. This case was recently held to fall beyond the statute of limitations for bringing claims.
Alexander v. Oklahoma, 382 F.3d 1o6 (ioth Cir. 2004).
176. But see Naomi Bailin Wish & Stephen Eisdorfer, The Impact of Mount Laurel Initiatives: An
Analysis of the Characteristics of Applicants and Occupants, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1268, 1302-
03 (1997) (showing that anti-exclusionary zoning programs may benefit poor and middle-
class whites more than nonwhites).
177. E.g., S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 456 A.2d
390,451-52 (N.J. 1983).
178. Nat'l Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1965) (invalidating zoning for minimum
density of one house per four acres).
179. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 4oB, § 22 (West 2004).
,so. See RUSK, supra note 171, at 184.
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CONCLUSION
When the FHA approached Congress and state legislatures in the mid-
1930s, it succeeded in getting radical changes to banking safety-and-soundness
laws because it had a simple, logical, and basically correct argument: If the
FHA promised to make lenders whole in the case of default, it did not matter if
the lenders made loans that otherwise would present too great a risk to their
financial viability. This Note shows how quickly and how dramatically the
FHA was able to get safety-and-soundness regulations changed.
Concurrently, the FHA wholeheartedly adopted a simple, logical, and
utterly incorrect argument: Neighborhoods evolve on a predictable continuum
from all-white to all-black, and as neighborhoods move along this continuum,
home values decline. Even the economist credited with this theory, Homer
Hoyt, cautioned that reality was far more complex. But the FHA preferred to
see the world through this simple model, perhaps because it provided an
apparently neutral justification for the goal of keeping the races segregated as
millions of African-Americans left the rural South for Northern cities. This
justification, unlike more brazen strokes like racial zoning and later racial
covenants, would survive without effective legal change for three decades, until
mounting political pressure from the civil rights movement led President
Kennedy to reverse FHA policy.
When the FHA's simple and correct argument for safety-and-soundness
exceptions was combined with its simple and incorrect argument for racial
segregation, African-Americans were denied the opportunities to buy a home
in developing suburban neighborhoods and to build the wealth that became
the mainstay of the American white middle class. When African-Americans did
buy homes, usually using conventional mortgages, they not only tended to pay
more in down payments and roughly the same monthly payments when
compared with whites using FHA-insured mortgages, but they also got much
lower-quality homes. While private insurers might have arisen to offer African-
Americans the opportunities denied to them by the FHA, this Note
demonstrates that Congress and state legislatures amended safety-and-
soundness regulations in a way that disallowed competition with the FHA.
For three decades, the combination of safety-and-soundness regulations
and discrimination by the FHA created opportunities to build wealth for whites
and not for African-Americans, and made a historically questionable view of
racial segregation and neighborhood change the national norm. The changes to
the FHA that sprung from Kennedy's Executive Order have failed to
adequately address either the past disparity in wealth-building or the ongoing
preferences from many market actors for segregated neighborhoods that the
FHA helped create. While this Note does not suggest remedies, it does indicate
that remedies proposed by others may gain further legal and political support
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from understanding the history I describe. I hope that this Note will inspire
others to further explore what kinds of actions might help to undo the ongoing
harms caused by the combined effect of past safety-and-soundness regulations
and FHA discrimination.
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APPENDIX
Table 1.
STATE STATUTES WAIVING BANKING REGULATIONS FOR BANKS ORIGINATING FHA-
INSURED MORTGAGES, 1935-1937















No. 1O, § 3, 1935 Ala. Laws 11, 12
Act 48, § 1, 193 5 Ark. Acts 114, 115
Jan. 31, 1935
Feb. 18, 1935
Ch. 129, § 3, 1935 Coo. Sess. Laws 491, 492 Mar. 7, 1935
Ch. 150, 1935 Del. Laws 550
Co. 828, 3,1935 Fla. Laws
No. 408, 1937 Ga. Laws 423
1937 Ill. Laws 426, 428
Ch. 98, § 4, 1935 Iowa Acts 130, 131
Ch,. 77, § 3, 1935 Kani. Sess. Laws 121,1
Ch. 11, § 4, 1936 Ky. Acts 35, 37
No. 23,, _§ 6, 1936 La. Acts 624, 626
Ch. 2, 5 1, 1935 Me. Laws 202, 203
Ch. 5 67 , 2, 1935 Md. Lacs 1179 , 15 7
Ch. 162, 2, 1935 Mass. Acts 155, 155
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Ch. 49, 5 2, 1935 Minn. Laws 55, 56
cli. ~ ~ ~ ~ 2 - 27~j,13 M~ 5v
1 4, 1935 Mo. Laws 366, 377
Ch. 17, § 1, 1935 Neb. Laws 92, 92
New Hampshire Ch. 32, § 2, 1935 N.H. Laws 56, 57
New Mexico Ch. , 1 2, 1935 N.M. Laws io, 11
Newortk Ch. 71, i, 5cJ, 1935 N. es. aws, 7
North Carolina Ch- 71, §5, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 78, 79
Ohio
Oregon
1937 Ohio Laws 416
Ch. 4 n 3, 1935 Okr. Las laws 22 o I
Gh. 150, S 3i, 1935 Or. Laws 227,27
Rhode Island Ch. 2205, 1935 R.I. Pub. Laws 18o
South( Carol ina~ No. (,. 3, 135 SJC. Acts (,,68
Mar. 15, 1935
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Ch. 112, § 3, 1935 S.D. Sess. Laws 162, 162
Cit 137,193:5 Temni. Pub Acts 266
Ch. 9, 1935 Tex. Gen. Laws 26
Ch. 1,1937 Utah Laws -32
No. 170, 1 i(b), 1935 Vt. Acts & Resolves 172,
172
Ch. 88, 1936 Va. Acts i34
Ch. 9, § 56(a), i935 Wash. Sess. Laws 22,23
Ch. 113, -3, 1935W. Va. Acts 481, 482
Ch. 45§ 219.03, 1935 Wis. Sess. Laws 73, 74
Ch. 99,54,1'935 WYO. Sess. Laws, 132, 133
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South Dakota
Teninessce
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Washington
West Vir"ginia
Wisconsin
Wyomilil
Feb. 7, 1935
Apr. 19), 19)35
Jan. 31, 1C935
Mar. ii, 13
Mar. 28, 1935
Feb. i8, 1935
Feb. 2s, 1935
Apr. 27, 1935
Apr. 27, 1935
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